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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 19-1693 
___________ 
 
IN RE:  DAVID JAMES WARD, 
                     Petitioner 
____________________________________ 
 
On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the 
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey 
(Related to D.N.J. Civ. No. 2-17-cv-04202) 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P. 
April 25, 2019 
Before:  CHAGARES, RESTREPO and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 4, 2019) 
_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Petitioner David Ward seeks a writ of mandamus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1651, to 
compel the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey to file his motion 
to reopen. 
On June 08, 2017, petitioner, a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, filed a Privacy 
Act Complaint against the Federal Probation Office (“FPO”) alleging that the FPO failed 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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to respond to his Privacy Act Request and seeking, inter alia, to have the FPO correct and 
amend the pre-sentence investigation report that had been prepared for his sentencing 
back in 1996.  Ward was granted leave to proceed without prepayment of the applicable 
filing fees and, in an order entered on June 26, 2018, the District Court dismissed his 
complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 12(b)(6).  Ward asserts that he thereafter mailed a motion to reopen the Privacy 
Act Complaint to the District Court on December 27, 2018, but that his motion has yet to 
be filed.  Instead, Ward asserts that he received a notice from the District Court indicating 
that his case is closed.  He claims that his constitutional right to access to the courts, as 
well as his rights to due process and equal protection, have been denied as a result of the 
District Court’s failure to file his reopen motion. 
In a petition filed in this Court on April 3, 2019, Ward requested that the District 
Court be compelled to file his reopen motion.  Ward complied with the filing 
requirements for that petition on April 12, 2019.  The petition is thus ripe for disposition. 
A review of the District Court’s electronic docket shows that Ward’s motion to 
reopen was received and filed on the docket on January 2, 2019, less than a week after 
Ward mailed it.  Accordingly, insofar as Ward requests an order compelling the District 
Court to file his motion, we will dismiss the petition as moot.  See Blanciak v. Allegheny 
Ludlum Corp., 77 F.3d 690, 698-99 (3d Cir. 1996) (“If developments occur during the 
course of adjudication that eliminate a plaintiff’s personal stake in the outcome of a suit 
or prevent a court from being able to grant the requested relief, the case must be 
dismissed as moot.”). 
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Even if we were to liberally construe Ward’s petition as challenging the delay he 
has experienced in having his reopen motion disposed of, we would conclude that 
mandamus relief is not warranted.  Mandamus is a drastic remedy available only in 
extraordinary cases, see In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 418 F.3d 372, 378 (3d Cir. 
2005), as the petitioner must demonstrate that he has “no other adequate means” to obtain 
the relief desired and a “clear and indisputable” right to issuance of the writ.  Madden v. 
Myers, 102 F.3d 74, 79 (3d Cir. 1996).  Although a District Court has discretion over the 
management of its docket, see In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 685 F.2d 810, 817-18 (3d 
Cir. 1982), a federal appellate court “may issue a writ of mandamus on the ground that 
[the District Court’s] undue delay is tantamount to a failure to exercise jurisdiction.”  
Madden, 102 F.3d at 79.  Little more than three months have lapsed since the motion has 
been submitted and filed on the docket.  We do not find a delay of this length troubling in 
the instant case.  We are confident that the District Court will rule on Ward’s motion in 
due course and without undue delay. 
Given the foregoing, the petition will be denied. 
